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Abstract: Once you allow for persistence in macroeconomic variables,
two aspects of exchange rate credibility emerge whose relative importance
can vary over time. Hence, the effect of policy measures on interest rate dif-
ferentials becomes ambiguous. In this paper, a Markov-switching VAR that
allows for parameter shifts across regimes is employed to test the hypothesis
of regime-dependent determination of credibility for major EMS countries.
The model separates two regimes that are distinct with respect to the time
series properties of the interest rate spread. Regime-dependent impulse re-
sponse functions reveal substantial differences in the response of spreads to
macroeconomic shocks across regimes.
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11 Introduction
In the years following the crisis of the European Monetary System (EMS) in
1992/93, an extensive literature emerged trying to establish reliable links between
certain policy measures and market expectations of future exchange rate policy.
These models shed light on the strategic interaction between policy makers, the
central banks and ﬁnancial markets under uncertainty. Since the true weights
in the government’s loss function are assumed to be unknown, individuals form
expectations about the policymaker’s ”type” by using currently available obser-
vations to update their subjective prior probabilities about the government’s true
degree of commitment to a monetary or exchange rate target. This procedure, that
is known as Bayesian updating of beliefs, describes a continuouslearning process.
A certain set of policy measures is assumed to signal a tough type of government
whereas an other set of policies is assumed to signal a weak type. For example,
observations of a high growth rate of the money supply or of the budget deﬁcit
are frequently seen as an indicator of a weak type of government, since this would
result in depreciation pressure on the domestic currency. In a ﬁxed exchange rate
regime, beliefs about a weak commitment to the exchange rate parity must even-
tually lead to a higher interest rate spread with respect to the anchor currency.
A new strand of theoretical research focuses on ambiguous effects of pol-
icy measures on government’s credibility and hence on interest rate differentials.
Drazen and Masson (1994) allow for persistence of tough policies on unemploy-
ment in a two-period model that blends elements from the Barro-Gordon-type
literature (Barro and Gordon 1983a, 1983b) and from the escape-clause literature
initiated by Obstfeld (1997). They show that these policies can lead to a higher
instead of a lower interest rate differential if agents notice that a future relaxation
of these policies becomes inevitable: ”If tough policies constrain the room to ma-
noeuvre in the future, then following a tough policy may actually harm rather en-
hance credibility” (Drazen and Masson 1994, 744). As a result, the impact of the
policies observed on interest rate spreads strongly depends on the state or regime
assumedto prevail. This hypothesisstimulatedsubstantialempirical research, that
is, however, not entirely convincing.
In this paper a new way to test the hypothesis of regime-dependent determi-
nation of interest rate differentials is proposed. After a short summary of the
2literature building on Drazen and Masson (1994) in section two, section three de-
velopsa regime switchingVAR model. In section four, regime-dependentimpulse
response functions are calculated showing remarkable differences in the response
of European interest rate differentials to shocks in the real exchange rate and the
unemployment rate across regimes. Section ﬁve ﬁnally concludes.
2 The determination of interest rate differentials
In a world of uncertainty economic agents are forced to make inferences about
unknown parameters. Following the work of Backus and Drifﬁll (1985) an ex-
tensive literature treats the type of governments, central bankers or policymakers
as an unknown variable. Individuals use currently available information to form
rational expectations about the true type employing the learning algorithm known
as Bayes Rule. Applied to exchange rate policy, this framework implies that a
policymaker who tolerates high levels of unemployment in order to maintain the
given peg of the currency is seen as being a tough type. Hence, the observation
of a higher unemployment rate would lower the probability of facing a weak pol-
icymaker and would reduce devaluation expectations. If the public observes that
higher unemployment leads the policymaker to ease monetary policy in order to
stimulate demand, this would serve as evidence of a weak type. If interest rate
differentials reliably track down devaluation expectations, that is, as uncovered
interest rate parity holds, these expectations and the unemployment rate are posi-
tively related.
Drazen and Masson (1994) challenge these results. They modify the model’s
set-up by allowing for persistence of policy effects. A tough policy on unemploy-
ment, e.g., is on the one hand seen as signaling a tough type of government but
does on the other hand constrain the government’s future room to manoeuvre. In
other words, tolerating high levels of unemploymentin order to hold the exchange
rate parity raises the costs of these policies. As a result, even a tough policymaker
eventually decides to devalue.
What does this modiﬁed analysis mean for the empirical relationship between
policy decisions and measures of devaluation expectations? With persistence of
macro-policies there does not necessarily exist a unique positive correlation be-
tween unemployment rates and interest rate differentials. Credibility of the peg
3might not increase with every percentage point of employment the policymaker is
willing to sacriﬁce.
In essence, Drazen and Masson (1994) show that the interpretation of tough
policies by the public is to a certain extent dependent on the prevailing state or
regime of the economy. If the so-called ”signaling factor” dominates, higher un-
employment means higher credibility of the peg and, hence, lower interest rate
differentials. If, however, the ”external circumstances factor” dominates, unem-
ployment and interest rate spreads are positively related. The state-dependency
of the effect of policies on interest rates is the key point that motivates the appli-
cation of regime-switching models in the following sections. The central ques-
tion is whether we can identify different regimes empirically and whether we can
track down different patterns of adjustment dynamics of the interest rate follow-
ing shocks in unemployment that are depending on the regime prevailing in the
economy.
The empirical research investigating the credibility of exchange rate target
zones under the EMS was largely initiated by the work of Svennson (1991, 1993).
He develops various techniques to extract devaluation expectations from interest
rate differentials. Since he usesdailydata, he can onlyshedlightonthe timeseries
properties of this credibility measures. To measure credibility in target zones like
the Exchange Rate Mechanism (ERM) of the EMS, Svennson (1993) proposes the
drift-adjustment method that splits the interest differential in the expected change
of the exchange rate within the band and the expected change of the central parity
of the exchange rate system. However, due to practical problems, this measure is
not applied widely. In accordance to the literature on fundamental determinants
of credibility, this paper uses long-term interest rate differentials to approximate
credibility.1.
Following the pioneering work of Svennson (1991, 1993), later research tack-
les the interdependence of credibility measures with other macroeconomic vari-
ables. Caramazza (1993), Thomas (1994), Rose and Svensson (1994) and Chen
1De Grauwe (1994) points to the fact that the difference between raw interest rate differentials
and the drift-adjusted spreads becomes smaller when long-term interest rates are used. He also
applies simple interest rate spreads to measure credibility. Interestingly, Knot (1998) ﬁnds that
fundamentals are as relevant for the drift-adjusted measure as they are for the raw interest rate
differentials.
4and Giovannini(1997) provide broad empirical studies of the determination of ex-
change rate credibility. Tronzano, Psaradakis and Sola (2000) extend the work of
Svennson to a Bayesian framework and compute simple correlation coefﬁcients
between a credibility indicator and some macroeconomic variables. Bernhardsen
(2000) explores the determination of interest rate spreads in a panel study. He
ﬁnds signiﬁcant effects of inﬂation differentials, current account positions and,
which is relevant to this study, positive effects of the unemployment rate.2 How-
ever, these studies rely on linear estimation techniques and are not able to detect
the dynamics in the determination of credibility.
Closer to the present investigation are studies that look on the relationship
between the unemployment rate and a measure of exchange rate credibility in
more detail. De Grauwe (1994) explores correlations between the average of long
terminterestrate differentialsofmajorEMScountriesandtheunemploymentrate.
He ﬁnds a positive relationship between unemployment and the credibility of the
exchange rate system as a whole. Knot (1998) estimates a VAR and computes
variance decompositions to show the adjustment of the interest rate differential to
a shock in the unemployment rate. He ﬁnds that shocks in the unemployment rate
explain a signiﬁcant part of the dynamics of the spread. Hence, both authors see
structural parameters of the economy as forces driving exchange rate credibility.
Nevertheless, assuming a linear relationship might be misleading.
Among the ﬁrst who tried to shed some light on the hypothesis of regime-
dependency were Drazen and Masson (1994, 744) themselves: ”...our model sug-
geststhatthe partialeffect of unemploymenton theinterest rate differentialshould
be quite different in the different periods.” Their empirical technique can give
some preliminary evidence on the assumed non-linearities. They basically regress
long-termgovernmentbondyieldspreadsbetweenFrance and Germanyon amea-
sure of competitiveness of the French economy and on the French unemployment
rate using OLS. Splitting the sample into three phases they incorporate dummy
variables that can indicate structural breaks in the regression equation. The au-
thors calculate the timing of breakpoints by looking at known policy changes. In
addition, standard testing procedures, i.e. Andrew’s (1993) likelihood ratio test,
support the dates the structural breaks are assumed to occur. It is shown that the
2Favero, Giavazzi and Spaventa (1997) examinethe time series propertiesof Europeaninterest
rate differentials using high-frequencydata.
5three subperiods exhibit different relationships between the three variables. In the
ﬁrst period (1979:05-1982:12) and the third period (1987:01-1991:12), higher un-
employment is associated with higher interest rates relative to Germany. Follow-
ing the terminology of the authors, the ”external circumstances factor” dominates
peoples’ perception. In the second phase (1983:01-1986:12), however, higher un-
employmentis associated with lower interest rate differentials indicatingthe dom-
inance of the ”signaling factor”. Similar results were obtained from instrumental
variables estimation.
Ag´ enor and Taylor (1993), Masson (1995) and Ag´ enor and Masson (1999)
test the hypothesis of Drazen and Masson (1994) using more advanced empirical
techniques. In employing state-space models like the Kalman ﬁltering algorithm
they lay the ground for the application of regime switching models in this paper.3
Masson (1995) uses Kalman ﬁlter estimates for an analysis of credibility of the
Pound Sterling parity under the EMS. Ag´ enor and Masson (1999) use Kalman ﬁl-
tering to determine the factors that drove the credibility of the Mexican exchange
rate regime in the years preceding its ﬁnal collapse in December 1994.
Existing empirical research on policy credibility has so far established links
between policy variables and interest rate spreads for a number of countries and
various episodes. However, more empirical research is required to test the model
developed by Drazen and Masson (1994). In order to derive convincing evidence
in favour of time-varying effects of policy measures on credibility, an empirical
model is needed that explicitly recognizes the regime-dependency of the effects
presented above.
The prima-facie evidence presented by Drazen and Masson (1994) can be crit-
icizedonseveralgrounds. First, by usingappropriatelyspeciﬁeddummyvariables
to account for structural breaks they separate regimes using ex-post knowledge.
However, the central role of market expectations that are conditional on a certain
information set at each point in time is ignored. In fact, they are not able to show
the evolution or the dynamics of credibility. The regime-switching model pre-
sented below endogenously separates two regimes and tracks down regime-shifts
by simulating a Bayesian learning process.
Second, their estimation can only yield single OLS coefﬁcients that are de-
3Weber (1991, 1992) introduces Kalman ﬁltering techniques to the empirical analysis of gov-
ernments’ reputation and problems of exchange rate credibility.
6pendent on the period speciﬁed by various dummy variables. The model used in
this paper allows for a richer set of features that characterize distinct regimes with
respect to various time series properties of the interest rate spreads
Third, single equation OLS estimates cannot account for the interaction of the
variables. Here, the interaction of the variables is modelled as a Vector Autore-
gression (VAR). In this framework, the dynamic adjustment of the variables can
be detected that goes beyond mere impact effects incorporated in changing OLS
parameters.
The Kalman ﬁltering technique with time-varying coefﬁcients used in previ-
ous investigations is closely related to the regime-switching models employed in
this study. However, rather than assuming a continuous state variable, the regime-
switching speciﬁcation formulated below assumes a discrete state variable. The
model can therefore select different regimes that closely match the theoretical no-
tion of ”regime” used by Drazen and Masson (1994). Since the application of
switching VAR processes allows the adoption of standard impulse response anal-
ysis, it is particularly helpful for analyzing the evolution of credibility in response
to various shocks.
3 Interest rates and regime-switching models
Modelling interest rates by means of switching regressions is still a rather novel
technique that ismostlyapplied in assessinginterest rates as indicators of business
cycles, to test for term structure issues or to improve the forecasting performance
of interest rate modelling.
A small number of studies applies regime-switching models to study the evo-
lution of credibility. G´ omez-Puig and Montalvo (1997) propose the conditional
regimeprobabilitiesthat resultfrom the estimationof an univariateregimeswitch-
ing model of realignment expectations as an indicator of EMS credibility. They
clearlydemonstratethedeteriorationofEMS-credibilitysurroundingtheexchange
rate crises. Valente (1998) shows the impact of ﬁscal policies in Italy on the term
structure of Lira-Deutschemark interest rate differentials in a Markov-switching
VAR whereas Amato and Tronzano (2000) extend the basic regime-switching au-
toregressive model by allowing for time-varying transition probabilities that are
regressed on variables describing Italian ﬁscal policy. Dahlquist and Gray (2000)
7model weekly short-term interest rates of EMS countries in a Markov-switching
frameworkthat allowsfor non-linearitiesin themean and the varianceof the series
to show the existence of different regimes that correspond to different degrees of
exchange rate credibility. In addition, they extend the model and allow for time-
varying transition probabilities to shed some light on the determinants of regime-
shifts. It turns out that the inclusion of the level of the interest rate differentials
relative to Germany and of variables that describe the position of the currency
within the target zone into the regression equation of the transition probabilities
signiﬁcantly improves the performance of the model. However, they do not go
beyond univariate analysis and, in particular, do not analyze whether a regime-
sensitive relationship between interest rate spreads and macroeconomic variables
can be identiﬁed. The work of Jeanne (1997) and Jeanne and Masson (2000)
on the French Franc is closely related to the present study. They regress devalua-
tion expectationson macroeconomic variables like unemploymentand the real ex-
change rate in a regime switchingspeciﬁcation as it is done in the model presented
below. However, they allow only the intercept term of the single-equation regres-
sion to shift between two states. Since they are interested in giving evidence of
the self-fulﬁlling nature of currency crises, they interpret these parameter shifts as
sudden switches in expectations that drive devaluation expectations in a way that
cannot be explained by fundamentals alone. The contribution of the present paper
is to extend these models by settingup a VAR model where variousparameters are
allowed to switch. In this framework, it is possible to show the regime-dependent
impact of macroeconomic fundamentals on devaluation probabilities.
3.1 Markov-switching models
In Markov-switching (MS) models the parameters to be estimated are allowed
to switch between states. Whereas conventional time series models assume sta-
ble parameter representations over the entire sample period, regime-switching
models can easily deal with structural breaks in the variables. Hamilton (1988,
1989, 1990) popularized Markov-switching models by offering convenient ﬁlter-
ing algorithms. Since Markov-switching models can be interpreted as applying
a discrete version of the Kalman ﬁlter, the basic structure follows the tradition
of state-space modelling. Hence, these models are structured along the lines of
8a data-generating process that is supplemented by a regime- or state-generating
process.4
Here, the Markov-switching assumption is build into a vector-autoregressive


















￿ of the VAR structure in equation (1) are allowed to switch,























































































The realization of each observation
￿ at date




















￿ hence the existence of two regimes is assumed. All realizations




As explained earlier, the Markov-switching model as a discrete version of
Kalman ﬁlter state-space models relies on a law that governs the realization of
the discrete state variable. Hamilton (1988, 1989, 1990) proposes the application








































































If the state would be observable at each point in time, dummy variables could
be used to condition the parameter-estimates on a certain state. In the class of
models applied here, however, the regime that prevails at time
( is unobservable.


















@ is called transition probability and says how likely state
< will be followed by state










































. If exactly one eigenvalue of the transition matrix is equal to unity
4See Kim and Nelson (1999) and Franses and van Dijk (2000) for accessible textbook treat-
ments of Markov models
9and all other eigenvalues lie inside the unit circle, the Markov-process is said to
followanergodic Markovchain. Aspecialcase are chainsthatendinan absorbing
state after which the chain stops (a so-called reducible Markov chain). In this








￿ Matrix is equal to zero so that the matrix can
be reduced to a triangular matrix. For the use of Markov chains as underlying
regime-generating processes of stationary VAR models the property of ergodicity
and non-reducibility are essential.
The transition probabilities are assumed to be constant. In an interesting exer-
cise these probabilities could be formulated as time-varying transition probabili-
ties that could then be regressed on a set of macroeconomic fundamentals follow-
ing Diebold, Lee and Weinbach (1994). However, this extension is not pursued
here but is left for another study.
Since the state variable is assumed to be unobservable, the estimation proce-
dure is based on the iterative Baum-Lindgren-Hamilton-Kim-ﬁlter (BLHK-ﬁlter,
see Krolzig (1997)) that infers the regime-probabilities at each point in time. At
the centre of this estimation procedure lies a Bayesian learning procedure. Agents
are assumed to update their probability assessment using the information entailed
in each subsequent observation. Since the Bayesian updating of individual beliefs
incorporated in the estimation closely matches agents’ rational expectations in-
ferences, Markov-switching models are particularly useful to study the dynamics,
that is, the evolution of credibility.
As a by-product of the ﬁlter-inferences, a likelihood function can be set up






























































































































































10where the second part of this expression follows from applying the rules of















































￿ . The non-linear EM algorithm (Expectation-Maximization algorithm) is

































￿ includes the VAR-parameters to be estimated. What is
most important to keep in mind is that the attractiveness of this class of Markov-
switching models lies in its ability to estimate the dating of the regimes and the
regression parameters simultaneously. Since the model endogenously selects two
distinct regimes and tracks down conditional regime probabilities at each point
in time, no a priori knowledge about the dates of the regime shifts is necessary.
Rather, the model lets the data determine which realization of the series was gen-
erated under what regime.
3.2 EMS spreads in a MSIAH-VAR(
￿ ) model
In this section, interest rate spreads of major EMS countries are modelled using
regime-switching processes. In particular it is assumed that each country’s ex-
perience can be described by a VAR that allows for shifts in all parameters as
described by equation (1).
For each country
























































￿ and the ﬁrst difference















The model comprises three variables in order to remain comparable to the original
results of Drazen and Masson (1994) presented above and to limit the number of
parameters to be estimated. An obvious extension of the approach taken here
would be to include other fundamentals like budget deﬁcits, the level of the public
debt etc.
In analogy to Drazen and Masson (1994) long term interest rates are used that
are obtained from the IMF’s International Financial Statistics database. Here the
11interest rates on long-term government bonds are included for reasons of compat-
ibilitysince the existingliterature mostly focuses on long term rates rather than on
short term spreads, see Drazen and Masson (1994) and Masson (1995). The real
effectiveexchangerate wasprovidedonJ.P.Morgan’swebsite(http://www.jpmorgan.com).
A higher exchange rate means an appreciation of the domestic currency. Here, the
real exchange rate is meant to be a measure of competitiveness as an overvalued
exchange rate is frequently seen as dampening exports and making an expan-
sionary nominal devaluation more likely. The unemployment rate used in this
model is either the standardized unemployment rate or the percentage of unem-
ployed relative to the total labour force as given by the OECD’s database. Since
the hypothesis of a unit-root cannot be rejected by applying standard augmented
Dickey-Fuller tests, estimating the VAR in levels is not appropriate. Hence, each
series is modiﬁed in order to get stationary variables. For the interest rate spread,
simple difference-stationarity is assumed. The unemployment rate and the real ef-
fective exchange rate are modelled as trend-stationary series. A standard Hodrick-
Prescott ﬁlter is used to extract a linear trend and to identify the temporary com-
ponents of both variables. The raw data used in this study is displayed in ﬁgure 1,
ﬁgure 2 and ﬁgure 3 in the appendix.
The model is estimated separately for major EMS countries over a sample pe-
riod that runs from the early days of the ERM to the ﬁrst monthsof EMU in 1999.5
All data is at monthly frequency.6 Hence, this study covers the whole period the
EMS was operating or exchange rates were actively managed, respectively. This
is particularly interestingsince the convergence process induced by the Maastricht
treaty and the scheduled start of European Monetary Union in 1999 is likely to al-
ter the structural relationships between the variables in favour of a more credible
exchange rate policy. In order to secure a sufﬁcient number of degrees of free-
dom and to reduce the already heavy computational requirements, a parsimonious
modelling approach is helpful. Therefore, the number of lags included in the VAR






￿ For each estimation the number of regimes is restricted to
two. Trials with more than two regimes failed due to the large number of param-
5In particular, the sample covers the following periods: 1979:01-1999:03 for France and the
UK and, for reasons of data availability, 1982:01-1999:03for Italy.
6The BLHK ﬁlter, the maximum likelihood estimation and the EM algorithm are implemented
using the MSVAR procedure which is written in Ox 2.0 and was developed by Krolzig (1998).
12eters to be estimated or gave highly implausible results.
If the hypothesis of Drazen and Masson (1994) is correct, one would expect
the VAR model to determine two states that are characterized by distinct time
series properties of the interest rate spread and different patterns of interaction be-
tween the variables included. Regime-dependent determination of exchange rate
credibilitywould implythat shocks in the unemploymentrate or the real exchange
rate affect the spread in different ways depending on the regime prevailing. The
most interesting results and some diagnostic tests are reported in table (1).
The non-linear speciﬁcation of the three-variable VAR system yields a higher
maximum of the log-likelihood function for each sample country than the linear




￿ can be interpreted as a measure of the model’s
goodness of the ﬁt for the maximum likelihood estimator represents the value of
the model’s parameters for which the sample is most likely to have been observed.
To test the quality of the nonlinear model against the corresponding linear VAR,








7 degrees of freedom. However, the LR test under normal condi-
tions does not apply here due to the existence of unidentiﬁed nuisance parameters
under the alternative (the transition probabilities are not identiﬁed under the lin-
ear model). The use of the standard
￿
￿ distribution would therefore cause a bias
of the test against the null.7 To circumvent the problem of unidentiﬁed nuisance
parameters, an overly cautious approach is used in this study. This means that












the number of nuisance parameters. Since the test statistic exceeds the critical
value even under this overly conservative benchmark, the null-hypothesis can be
rejected at high signiﬁcance levels. An alternative to this procedure is offered by
Davies (1977) who adjusts the test statistic by deriving an upper bound for the
signiﬁcance level, see Krolzig (1997). The results remain highly signiﬁcant under
this modiﬁed test. Thus, a non-linear regime switching speciﬁcation seems to be
not only appropriate but rather superior to conventional linear models.
Figures (4), (6) and (8) in the appendix show the conditional regime proba-
bilities obtained from Hamilton’s estimation method. Here, only the smoothed
regime probabilities are reported, that is, the probability assessment based on the
information set
￿
5 that comprises all observations in the sample. In all countries,
7See Hansen (1992), Andrews and Ploberger (1994) and Garcia (1998) for this problem.
13the model detects regime shifts that occur at dates that do not always correspond
-at least in the case of France- to the splited sample period in the speciﬁcation of
Drazen and Masson (1994). These conditional regime probabilities as well as the
reportedtransitionmatricesandtheexpecteddurations(seetable1) makeobvious,
that the regimes are characterized by different degrees of persistence. Whereas,
e.g., regime one and regime two in France last for more than two years each, they
last for one and a half years and nine months in the UK.
Each country’s results will be interpreted in more detail below after the frame-
work for the analysis of the dynamic adjustment following shocks is elaborated in
the next section.
How are the regimes characterized and in what respect do they differ? It is
important to note that the model selects the regime characteristics in order to ﬁt
the speciﬁcation efﬁciently to the data. However, it turns out that the regime prop-
erties can be interpreted reasonably well. Due to the large number of parameters
only the vector of intercept terms is reported here as an example. Take, for ex-
ample, the United Kingdom. The model selects regime one as being marked by
an undervalued real exchange rate (relative to the trend), an unemployment rate
that lies below its trend and a narrowing interest rate spread, whereas regime two
shows an overvalued real exchange rate, above-trend unemployment and a widen-





































































































Similar characteristics result for the other sample countries.8 To gauge the
dynamic interaction between the variables in each regime and especially between
macroeconomic variables and the credibility proxy, the following section com-
putes regime-dependent impulse response functions.
8The numbering of regimes is done rather arbitrarily by the algorithm. Notwithstanding the
classiﬁcation of being regime one or two, the time series properties remain the decicive character-
istics of the regimes.
144 Regime-dependent impulse response functions
The interpretation of the set of the 74 VAR parameters to be estimated is not
straightforward. For this reason, the proﬁle of the system’s response to shocks is
usually derived to visualize the dynamics represented by the VAR model. These
so-called impulse response functions are a very convenient way to track down the
magnitude and the persistence of each variable’s response to economic shocks
over time. In the VAR literature shocks are understood as being unexpected
changes or innovations in one of the system’s variables.
For the purpose of this paper the response patterns within a certain regime
are most important. Here, the technique developed by Ehrmann, Ellison and Valla
(2000)isused. Theyderiveimpulseresponsefunctionsthatare regime-dependent.
Since each regime is characterized by distinct time series properties of the observ-
able variables, these sets of parameters can be used to study the dynamic adjust-
ment of the system to an unexpected Gaussian innovation.9















































































A plot of the row i, column j element of
￿
￿
￿ as a function of the response’s time
horizon













) with all other variables dated
( or earlier held constant.
In order to interpret the impulse functions reasonably, the structural shocks
that drive the VAR dynamics must be exactly identiﬁed, see Sims (1980). For
this reason, a triangular identiﬁcation scheme known as Choleski decomposition
is employed. This is done by imposing an order of the variables onto the system
which implies that each variable has contemporaneous effects only on itself and




9Ehrmann (2000) uses the same technique to study asymmetries in the monetary transmission
process. He models business cycle phases as the realization of an unobservableMarkov-switching
process. Kakes (2000) also shows asymmetric effects of monetary policy over the course of the
business cycle. However, he does not provide evidence of the signiﬁcance of the effects.
15(7) means that shocks to the real exchange rate affect both the unemployment rate
and the interest rate differential, but that shocks to the unemployment rate affect
the interest rate spread only. Let































In this regime-dependent VAR set-up the impulse response functions are cal-
culated separately for each regime
) . It is assumed that the given regime prevails



























7 are considered. Depending on the regime prevailing when the
shock occurs, the system should respond in different ways to these macroeco-
nomic shocks. All impulse response patterns show the effect of a single shock of





￿ months. The conﬁdence bands
are computed employing standard bootstrapping algorithms following Ehrmann,
Ellison and Valla (2000) who kindly provided their software. Artiﬁcial histories
for the variables and for the unobservable state variable are created by drawing
random numbers from appropriate distributions and inserting these numbers into
the MS-VAR system using the estimated parameter values. The model is then es-
timated with these artiﬁcial data. Replicating this procedure 1000 times gives a
sufﬁciently precise distribution of the estimates that allows an assessment of the
signiﬁcance of each impulse response.
The regime-dependentimpulseresponsefunctionsare shownin ﬁgures (2), (4)
and (6) in the appendix. As the most striking result from this analysis it occurs,
that the responses of the interest rate spread to various shocks are indeed different
across regimes. It is important to keep in mind that what is important in this study
is not so much the signiﬁcance of each country’s reaction to shocks but rather the
difference of these reactions across regimes. The insigniﬁcance of some impulse
response patterns when analyzed in isolation is in line with the literature since
most authors including Drazen and Masson (1994), Jeanne (1997) and Jeanne and
Masson (2000) only ﬁnd insigniﬁcant relationships between spreads and macroe-
conomic variables. However, as non-monotonic relations between spreads and
macroeconomic data are the focus of this paper, the regime-dependency of the
impulse responses supports the hypothesis of regime-dependent determination of
exchange rate credibility.
16In France, regime one corresponds to the Drazen-Masson notion of a signaling
regime explained above. The interest rate spread relative to Germany decreases in
response to shocks in the real exchange rate and the unemployment rate, hence,
credibility is strengthened, see ﬁgure 5. In regime two on the contrary, which
is the external circumstance regime in the terminology of Drazen and Masson
(1994), the interest rate spread reacts positively to these shocks. Hence, credi-
bility deteriorates because individuals perceive a devaluation as more likely. As
ﬁgure 4 makes clear, the signaling regime prevailed during the 1990s. During that
period, exchange rate stability was a prerequisite for the realization of European
Monetary Union. Only during the turbulences in 1992/1993 that forced the de-
valuation of several EMS currencies, regime two prevailed. With the exception of
1982/1983, the 1980s saw regime two dominating with credibility deteriorating
following higher unemployment and a stronger real exchange rate. The shift in
1982/1983 corresponds to the results of Drazen and Masson (1994). They refer
to the announcement of a ”politique de rigueur” [italics in original] of the newly
elected socialist government in France, after its initial Keynesian macroeconomic
policy had failed.
In Italy, regime one is characterized by a negative reaction of interest rate
differentials to macroeconomic shocks, whereas regime two shows a positive re-
action (ﬁgure 7). However, the shapes of the impulse response functions are not
as striking as in the case of France. The switches occur very often reﬂecting the
uncertainty of ﬁnancial markets with regard to the stance of Italian economic pol-
icy (ﬁgure 6). In the second half of the 1990s, regime one clearly prevailed as
the Maastricht convergence process required exchange rate stability and monetary
policy discipline.
In the UK, regime two can be clearly identiﬁed as being the signaling regime
(ﬁgure 9). Regime two was most likely to govern the VAR process in the begin-
ningand the end of the 1990sand in someepisodesin the 1980s(ﬁgure 8).10 Since
the UK decided to stay out of EMU for the time being, the shift towards a signal-
ing regime occurring around 1997 cannot be explained as being induced by the
Maastricht convergence process. An alternative explanation could be the decision
10Estimating the model through 1992 when the UK left the exchange rate mechanism results in
comparable regime probabilities and similar impulse response functions. However, the likelihood
ratio test statistic is signiﬁcant only at the 10 percent level.
17of the newly elected Labour government to grant the Bank of England indepen-
dence in setting monetary policy. This shields monetary policy from political
inﬂuence and forces the central bank to gain reputation. As in the case of France
in 1982/1983, the newly elected government in the UK in 1997 and the newly
formed government in 1990 are facing a high degree of uncertainty and, hence,
try to establish some reputation for being tough on unemployment and monetary
policy. As a result, ﬁnancial markets considered a signaling regime most likely to
govern the interest rate differential relative to Germany.
In general, the hypothesisof regime-dependentdeterminationof exchangerate
credibility can be supported by the MS-VAR model. It turns out that these results
are fairly robust with respect to the ordering of the variables, the number of lags
included and the choice of the technique employed to obtain stationary series. In
addition, running the model with short term (three months) euro-rates instead of
long-termgovernmentbondyieldsleadstosimilarresultsalthoughtheconditional
regime probabilities show an implausible degree of persistence of each regime.
An applications of the present model to smaller EMS countries is left for further
research.
5 Conclusion
In this paper a three-dimensional regime switching VAR system is estimated in
which the vector of intercept terms, the matrices of the autoregressive parame-
ters and the variance-covariance matrix of the innovations are allowed to switch
across states. In order to test the hypothesis of regime-dependent interaction be-
tween interest rate spreads and various macroeconomic shocks, the VAR model
is ﬁtted to the interest rate differential, the real exchange rate and the unemploy-
ment rate for France, Italy and the UK. The model endogenously selects the dates
of the regime shifts and distinguishes between two remarkably different regimes.
Regime-dependent impulse response functions that are obtained from a Choleski-
decomposition of the variance-covariance matrices reveal substantial differences
in the response patterns of the interest rate differential.
For all countries, the model identiﬁes one regime in which the interest rate
spread reacts positivelyto a shock in the real exchange rate and the unemployment
rate and one regime in which the interaction has a negative sign. These regimes
18correspond to the notion of Drazen and Masson (1994) who refer to an external
circumstance regime in the ﬁrst case and a signaling regime in the latter. Hence,
this paper provides some evidence on the regime dependent nature of exchange
rate credibility.
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￿ denotes the set of parameters obtained from an estimation of the restricted
(linear) VAR model. To circumvent the problem of unidentiﬁed nuisance parameters,











￿ distribution where the number
of restrictions is supplemented by the number of nuisance parameters. Alternatively, the
method of Davies (1977) is used who derives a bounded test statistic. The expected dura-
tion of regime








! ; the reported durations are the exact numbers whereas
the probabilities are rounded.
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